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u 
he nation's  money supply is closely linked to 
deficit  spending  by  the Federal  government, 
many analysts contend. Due to the way  monetary 
policy is conducted, these observers argue, money 
grows rapidly  when  the  deficit  in  the  Federal 
budget is large and grows slowly when the deficit 
is  small  or  when  surpluses  occur.  This  article 
undertakes an  analytical  and  empirical  examina- 
tion of these propositions. The first section of the 
article reviews the analytical relationship between 
budget  deficits  and  surpluses and  money,  while 
the second section presents results of the empirical 
examination. 
WEWUOBWSWOB  BEUWEEW  DEFUCOUS  AND 
SURPLUSES AND  UME MONEY SUPPLY 
In analyzing  the relationship  between Federal 
budget  deficits  and  surpluses  and  the  money 
supply,  it  is  useful  to distinguish  direct  effects 
from indirect effects. Budget deficits occur when 
government expenditures exceed revenues. A def- 
icit will lead to a direct rise in the money supply if 
the U.S. Treasury finances the deficit not by bor- 
rowing but by drawing down balances it holds at 
commercial banks or Federal Reserve Banks. That 
is  because  government  expenditures  result  in  a 
shift  of  funds  into  money  balances  held  by  the 
public,  and  out  of  deposit  balances  held  by  the 
U.S. Treasury, which are not a part of the money 
supply. The government revenues, though, result 
in a shift out of the public's  money balances and 
into Treasury  deposits.  Therefore,  when  expen- 
ditures  exceed  revenues,  money  balances  will 
increase  and  Treasury  deposits  will  fall.'  Simi- 
larly, when revenues exceed expenditures and the 
Treasury  does  not  use  the  resulting  surplus  to 
repay debt held by the public, money balances will 
decline and Treasury  deposits  will  rise.  In prac- 
tice,  changes  in  Treasury  deposits  arising  from 
deficits and surpluses  may importantly  affect the 
money supply over short periods, but are quanti- 
~  -- 
tatively unimportant for longer periods. 
If deficits and surpluses are not accompanied 
by  changes  in  Treasury  deposits,  they  will  not 
directly  alter  money  balances. When a deficit  is 
accompanied by borrowing, the increase in money 
due to expenditures exceeding revenues is offset 
by a decline in the money balances of  those who 
the obligations issued  by  the Treasury. 
when a  surplus  is  accompanied  by  debt  repay- 
IIThe financing of a deficit by drawing down Treasury balances may 
affect  commercial  bank  reserves as well  as the  money  supply.  If 
Treasury deposits at Federal  Reserve Banks rather than at commer- 
cial banks are drawn down, reserves will increase. Unless the increase 
is offset by the Federal Reserve System, commercial banks may use 
the reserves to acquire earning assets. This may lead to a rise in the 
money supply beyond  the direct increase caused by  the financing of 
the deficit. The Federal  Reserve may, of course, offset the  increase 
in both reserves and the money supply arising from a deficit financed 
by drawing down Treasury deposits. 
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ment,  the decline in  money due to revenues ex- 
ceeding expenditures is offset by an inbrease in the 
money  balances  of  those  who  were  holding 
redeemed securities. 
Deficits  and  surpluses  unaccompanied  by 
changes in Treasury deposits may indirectly affect 
money. These indirect effects may be both quan- 
titatively significant and long-lived and may result 
in a correlation between deficits and surpluses and 
money. To facilitate exposition, in the analysis of 
indirect effects and in the remainder of the article, 
the term "deficits and surpluses" is  not  used. 
Instead, the term "deficit,"  which may be positive 
or negative, is employed and is defined as Federal 
government expenditures minus revenues. In  this 
terminology, a surplus or an excess of  revenues 
over  expenditures  is  referred  to  as  a  negative 
deficit. 
A deficit  not  accompanied  by  a  change  in 
Treasury  deposits  may  indirectly  affect  money 
because it  may  lead  to changes in  interest rates. 
The  public,  commercial banks,  and  the Federal 
Reserve System may then respond to these interest 
rate changes in ways that affect money. A positive 
deficit  (expenditures  exceed  revenues)  financed 
by  borrowing will tend to cause interest rates to 
increase.  The  rise  in  interest rates  will  tend  to 
reduce the demand for M1 balances, which con- 
sists of currency plus demand deposits held by the 
public. When the public shifts out of  M1 and into 
other assets, MI will tend to decline. 
As  offering  rates  on  time  deposits  increase 
along with other interest rates, part of the balances 
moving out of M1 may be placed in time deposits. 
To the extent that  M1 balances are drawn down 
and  transferred  to  time  deposits,  the  required 
reserves of  the  banking  system  will decline and 
excess reserves will increase. This, along with the 
rise  in  interest  rates,  will  encourage  banks  to 
acquire earning assets,  which  will tend to offset 
some of the initial drop in M1 and add to the initial 
increase  in  time deposits.  The  net  impact  on 
money resulting from these responses by  the pub- 
lic and  commercial banks cannot be  determined 
analytically.  M1  would  probably  decline  but, 
because  M2 consists  of  M1  plus  time  deposits 
other than large negotiable CD's,  M2 might de- 
cline or increase.  Similarly,  responses  by  the 
public and commercial banks to a decline in inter- 
est rates associated with a negative deficit (that is, 
a surplus with  revenues exceeding expenditures) 
accompanied by debt repayment would tend to in- 
directly cause M1 to increase and the effect on M2 
would be uncertain. 
In  terms of  responses by  the Federal Reserve 
System, it is often argued that the Federal Reserve 
conducts monetary policy in a way that results in a 
correlation between the deficit and money. Some 
observers hold that the correlation occurs because 
the Federal Reserve tries to stabilize interest rates. 
They contend that the Federal Reserve responds to 
the  deficit-induced  upward  pressure  on  interest 
rates  by  acquiring  U.S.  Government  securities 
andlor  providing  banks  with  reserves  in  other 
ways,  thereby  encouraging commercial banks  to 
augment their holdings of  earning assets.  These 
increases  in  the  earning  assets  of  the  banking 
system  are  accompanied by  increases  in  money 
balances,  thereby  resulting  in  a  correspondence 
between  the deficit and  the  behavior of  money. 
The  argument  would  be  similar  for  a  negative 
deficit;which  would place downward pressure on 
interest rates.  In  trying to stabilize interest rates, 
the Federal Reserve would reduce bank reserves and 
the money supply would decline. While the Federal 
Reserve may at times attempt to stabilize interest 
rates, however, it often allows interestrates to move 
up or down. Thus, any argument that the conduct 
of  policy results in a correspondence between the 
deficit and  money should not be based on the as- 
sumption  that  the  Federal  Reserve  attempts  to 
stabilize interest rates. 
An  alternative  hypothesis  about  the  Federal 
Reserve's approach to policymaking is that it sets 
out to influence interest rates, but does not neces- 
sarily seek to stabilize them. The alternative would 
postulate that the Federal Reserve determines its 
interest rate policy in light of economic conditions 
such as unemployment and inflation. If  followed, 
this approach to 'policymaking may  tend to  pro- 
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duce a correspondence between the deficit and the 
money supply. 
In  the latter part of  a recession and the early 
part of an economic recovery, for example, when 
unemployment is high and the inflation rate is low, 
the  Federal  Reserve  may  allow  interest rates to 
decline or,  at  least,  resist upward movements in 
rates. At the same time, due to the sluggishness of 
the economy, Federal revenues are declining and 
transfer-payment expenditures  are  rising  so  that 
the deficit is large.  The consequent heavy Trea- 
sury  borrowing  is  placing  upward  pressure  on 
interest  rates.  To  prevent  rates from  rising,  the 
Federal  Reserve  would  purchase  U.S.  Govern- 
ment securities in  volume and/or undertake other 
reserve-supplying  actions,  which  would  lead  to 
large money supply increases. Thus, large money 
supply  increases  would  accompany  the  large 
deficit and would result, in part, from the combi- 
nation of the large deficit and the Federal Reserve's 
policy  of  minimizing upward  movements in  in- 
terest rates. 
As the economy moves into the middle stage 
of  an  economic  expansion,  when  inflationary 
pressures  develop  and  unemployment  falls,  the 
Federal Reserve may allow interest rates to rise. At 
the same time, due to the economic recovery, the 
deficit is small. The consequent reduction in Trea- 
sury  borrowing  alleviates  some  of  the  upward 
pressure  on  interest  rates.  In  allowing  interest 
rates to rise, the Federal Reserve would be forced 
to  moderate the increases in  the money supply. 
Thus, the small increases in money would accom- 
pany  the  small  deficit  and  would  be  brought 
about,  in  part,  by  the combination of  the small 
deficit and the Federal Reserve's policy of  allow- 
ing interest rates to rise. 
In  the latter part of  a recovery and  the early 
part of a recession, when inflationary pressures are 
strong  and  unemployment  is  low,  the  Federal 
Reserve may  be  pushing  interest rates up or, at 
least,  resisting  downward  movements.  At  the 
same time,  due  to  the  inflation,  the  deficit  is 
negative,  i.e.,  a  surplus  occurs.  Consequently, 
the  Treasury  is  repaying  debt,  and  this  places 
strong downward pressure on  interest rates. The 
Federal Reserve, in order to resist downward in- 
terest rate movements,  would  reduce the money 
supply.  Thus,  the  decline  in  the  money  supply 
would accompany the negative deficit and would 
be brought about, in  part, by the combination of 
the negative deficit in the budget and the Federal 
Reserve's  policy  of  resisting  downward  move- 
ments in interest rates. 
In  summary,  it  is  sometimes contended that 
the  Federal  Reserve  may  respond  to deficit- 
induced alterations in interest rates in a way that 
results in large money supply increases when the 
deficit  is  large,  small  money  supply  increases 
when the deficit is small, and declines in  money 
when the deficit is negative. That is, Federal Re- 
serve  responses  may  produce  a  correlation  be- 
tween the deficit and  the  money  supply.  It  was 
earlier  shown  that  responses  by  the  public  and 
commercial  banks  may  also  result  in  corre- 
spondence  between  the  deficit  and  money.  The 




This section examines the relationship between 
the deficit and the money supply and certain other 
variables during the 1955-74 period. Yearly data on 
the deficit along with changes in M1 and M2 are 
shown in Chart 1. Also, to examine the extent to 
which Federal Reserve operations may be related 
to the deficit, Chart 1 contains yearly data on mem- 
ber  bank  reserves,  U.S.  Government  securities 
held  by  the  Federal  Reserve  System,  and  the 
monetary base,  which  consists of  member  bank 
reserves plus currency held by the public and non- 
member banks. 
Chart  1 indicates there is  very  little year-to- 
year  correspondence between  movements in  the 
deficit and  movements in  any  of  the other vari- 
ables, although the other variables trended upward 
with  the deficit  in  the  1955-74 period.  For 
example, in  9 of  the 20  years in  the period, the 
change in M1 moved in the opposite direction from 
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Chart  1  Government  securities  corresponded  somewhat 
THE  DEFOCOT,  MONEY SUPPLY,  more closely with the deficit,  especially for  the 
AND QUMEW  VAWOAIILES  1967-73 period. Also, it is true that in those years 
1955-74  in  which  very  sharp  increases in  the deficit  oc- 
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the deficit.  The same is true to a slightly lesser 
extent for M2, reserves, and  the monetary base. 
Movements in Federal Reserve holdings of  U.S. 
1970-74 Period 
Monthly data for the 1970-74 period are avail- 
able and provide a more fruitful subject for a sta- 
tistical  examination  of  the  relationship  between 
the deficit and  the money supply.  In  the exami- 
nation of  the 1970-74 period, regression analysis 
was  applied to  monthly  data  to  try  to  discover 
statistically significant relationships between  the 
deficit and  MI, M2, the monetary base, member 
bank  reserves,  and  U.S.  Government  securities 
held by the Federal Reserve System. 
The analysis hypothesized that the behavior of 
each variable in  any  month  was  affected by  the 
behavior of the deficit in that month and in certain 
preceding months. For example, it was  hypothe- 
sized that the behavior of  M1 in  any month, say 
December 1974,  was  affected by  the behavior of 
the deficit in December 1974 and in certain months 
preceding December, say in each month from July 
1973  through  November  1974.  The  hypothesis 
that the behavior of  money and the other variables 
in any month was affected by  the behavior of  the 
deficit in past months is based on the notion that 
time  lags  exist  in  economic  behavior.  Because 
time is required to adjust to changing conditions, 
6  Federal Reserve  Bank  of Kansas  City Budget Deficits and The  Money Supply 
for example, a deficit may place upward pressure 
on interest rates for a number of  months after it 
occurs. In addition, the public, commercial banks, 
and the Federal Reserve System may not respond 
immediately to a change in interest rates but may 
respond over a period of  time. 
The regression  analysis  indicates  that  during 
the 1970-74 period, M2 was related to and affected 
by  the  deficit  in  a  statistically  significant  way. 
As shown in Table 1, for the regression measuring 
the impact of  the deficit on M2 over a 24-month 
period, the adjusted R2  was statistically significant 
and was .46. This may be interpreted to mean that 
on average 46 per cent of the behavior of M2 was 
accounted  for  by  the  behavior  of  the  deficit.  A 
significant  relationship  was  also  found  between 
the deficit and MI, but it was weaker than for M2. 
For MI,  only the 18-month regression produced a 
statistically  significant  R2,  and  it  indicates  that 
only 28 per cent of  the behavior of  M1 was ac- 
counted for by the behavior of the defi~it.~ 
While money  was  found  to be  related  to the 
deficit,  the  regression  analysis  does  not  support 
the proposition that the Federal Reserve responded 
to the  deficit  by  taking  actions 'that affected 
2IData  on  the  deficit  were  taken  from  the Treasury  Bulletin  and 
Monthly Treasury  Statement  of  Receipts and Outlays  of  the  United 
States Government. The latter  publication  contains  information  on 
liabilities owed and assets held by the Federal government. Liabilities 
minus assets, or net liabilities, may be symbolized by NL. The deficit 
is  equal  to the change  in  NL,  that is,  D  =A  NL.  In  the statistical 
analysis, it  was convenient to employ  levels rather than changes, so 
that NL rather than&NL or D was used. Thus, the analysis examined 
the relationship between  NL and the level of money balances rather 
than  between  D  and  changes  in  money  balances.  Monthly  data on 
NL  are  available beginning  in  July  1967,  so  that  the  period  from 
July  1967  through  November  1974  was  involved  in  the statistical 
analysis. 
Monthly  seasonally  adjusted  series  on  NL,  MI, and  the  other 
variables  were detrended  using  the autoregressive  technique.  (For a 
discussion of  this  technique, see  Robert  D.  Auerbach  and  Jack  L. 
Rutner, "Money  and Income:  Is There a Simple Relationship?" in 
the Monthly Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City, May 1975. 
See especially  footnote 11.) Detrended values of MI and  the other 
variables  were  regressed  on  detrended values  of  NL.  Using  MI to 
illustrate, the regression equations took the form: 
MIt = a + bo NLt + bl NLt.l  + ... + bn NLf.,,  + ut. 
To test for the possibility that NL is affected by, as well as affects, 
money, NL was regressed on MI and each of the other variables. These 
regressions took the form: 
NLt = a + bo MIt + bl Mlt.1  + ... + bn Mlt.,  + ut. 
In these  regressions, none of  the  Re's  were statistically  significant. 
It may be tentatively concluded,  therefore, that  the dominant direc- 
tion of causation is from the deficit  to money and that there is little 
or no feedback from money to the deficit. 
Table 1 
ADJUSTED R2'S  FOR  REGRESSIONS 
HAVING THE DEFICIT AS THE 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE 
Regressions Involving: 
Dependent Variable  18 Months  24 Months 
MI  .28*  .31 
M2  .40t  .46t 
Monetary base  .21  .58$ 
Member bank  reserves  .00  .00 
U.S.  Government securities held by 
Federal Reserve System  .O1  .02 
Commercial  paper rate  .47t  .49$ 
Federal funds rate  .00  .34 
'Stotist~ml s~~ndic~ncs  at 90 pr  cant  bl  of confidsnca. 
tStotist~col  rngnificonce at 95  pr  cent  kval of confidence. 
$R2  IS  rignificont but  rtatlstcolly  unml~obb  becouu, Durbin-Watson test  indater the 
exertenca of $anal  correlation. 
money. The analysis indicates that, while M2  was 
positively related to the deficit during the 1970-74 
period,  MI was  negatively  related.  Prior  to 
undertaking the analysis, it  was expected  that, if 
money was found to be significantly related to the 
deficit, a positive relationship would be indicated. 
That is, the regression  analysis  was  expected  to 
show that an increase in the deficit tended to result 
in an increase in money and a decrease in the def- 
icit tended to result in a decrease in money. Such a 
relationship  would  exist  if  the  Federal  Reserve 
responded  to  large  (small)  deficits  by  buying 
large  (small)  quantities  of  U.S. Government  se- 
curities and  taking other actions that led to large 
(small) increases in the money supply. 
However, since M1 was negatively related to 
the deficit, the Federal Reserve apparently did not 
respond  to the deficit  by  taking  actions  that  af- 
fected money.  Rather, it appears that the Federal 
Reserve allowed  the  deficit  to  change  interest 
rates.  Instead  of  arising  from  Federal  Reserve 
responses, the relationship between money and the 
deficit  was  due to  responses  by  the  public  and 
3/In addition  to Mi and  M2, the time deposit component of  M2 was 
regressed  on the deficit, but the RZ's were not significant. For the three 
variables, the sum of  the regression coefficients is as follows: 
Regressions Involving: 
18 Months  24 .Months  -- 
-1.847  -1.151 
M2  - ,193  +  ,749 
Time deposits  +  ,620  f3.846 
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commercial banks to the interest rate  change^.^ For 
example,  a  deficit-induced  increase  in  interest 
rates, along with the accompanying rise in offering 
rates on time deposits,  tended to reduce the de- 
mand  for  M  1  balances.  The  public,  therefore, 
tended to shift out of  M1 balances and into other 
assets, including time deposits. This shift tended 
to  reduce the required reserves and  increase the 
excess reserves of commercial banks, encouraging 
them to acquire earning assets. The rise in earn- 
ing assets tended to offset part of the initial decline 
in  M1 balances and add  to the initial increase in 
time deposits. On balance, these responses by  the 
public and  commercial banks  to  the  increase in 
interest rates accompanying the rise in the deficit 
tended to result in a decline in M1 and an increase 
in  M2.  Similarly,  a  deficit-induced drop  in  in- 
terest rates tended to lead to an increase in M1 and 
a decline in M2. 
The  conclusion that  the  Federal Reserve re- 
sponded to the deficit by allowing it to result in 
interest rate changes is further supported by  the 
results of  regression analysis directly testing the 
relationship between the deficit and interest rates. 
This analysis provides some evidence that, during 
the 1970-74 period, interest rates were related to 
and  affected by  the deficit in  a statistically sig- 
nificant way. To illustrate, for the regression mea- 
suring the impact of the deficit on the commercial 
paper rate over an 18-month period, the adjusted 
R2 was  statistically  significant  and  was  .47. 
In  addition,  the  relationship  was  positive,  in- 
dicating that a large (small) deficit led to a large 
(small) increase in the commercial paper rate.5 
The analysis did not uncover any statistically 
significant relationships between  the  deficit and 
the monetary base, member bank reserves, or U.S. 
~overnment  securities  held  by  the  Federal  Re- 
4/The conclusion that public and commercial bank responses produced 
the relationship between money and the deficit is based on the finding 
that the sums of the coefficients  are negative in the two MI regressions 
(see footnote 3).  The conclusion  that  M2 is positively  related  to the 
deficit  is based  on  the finding that,  in  the M2 regression  having  the 
largest number of lags (24), the sum of the coefficient is positive. Note 
that  the sums  of  the coefficients in  the time deposits  regressions  are 
positive.  This is  consistent  with  the conclusion  that  a deficit-induced 
increase  in  interest  rates,  accompanied  by  a rise  in offering rates on 
time  deposits,  resulted  in  a  shift  out of  MI  balances  and  into  time 
deposits. 
serve. Table 1 shows that, for regressions involv- 
ing these variables, the R2's were either not signif- 
icant or significant but not statistically reliable.6 
Thus,  the  evidence does  not  suppoit the  propo- 
sition that the Federal Reserve tends to respond to 
deficit spending in a systematic way by acquiring 
U.S.  Government  securities or  by  supplying re- 
serves or by expanding the monetary base so that 
commercial  banks  can  buy  U.S.  Government 
securities.  These  results  are consistent  with  the 
finding  that  the  relationship between  the deficit 
and money in  the 1970-74 period was due to re- 
sponses by the public and commercial banks rather 
than to Federal Reserve responses. 
The nation's money supply is closely linked to 
deficit spending by the Federal government, many 
analysts  contend.  According to  these observers, 
the  association is  due to  efforts  by  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  to  stabilize  interest  rates.  This 
leads the System to respond to deficits by buying 
U.S.  Government securities  and/or  taking other 
actions that result in increases in the money sup- 
ply. However, the deficit and money may  be re- 
lated for reasons other than or in  addition to the 
behavior of  the Federal Reserve. The public and 
commercial banks, as well as the Federal Reserve 
System, may respond to deficit-induced alterations 
in interest rates in  ways that affect money. 
Empirical  analysis  undertaken  in  this  article 
suggests that  the  deficit  and  money  are  related. 
While an examination of yearly data for the 1955- 
74 period reveals little or no year-to-year associ- 
ation, regression analysis applied to monthly data 
5IFor the commercial paper and Federal funds regressions, the sums of 
the coefficients  are as follows: 
Regressions  Involvine:  -G-onths  ~  -~~  --  ~ 
24 ~onihs  -- 
Commercial ~auer  +.405  + 2.776 
Federal fund;  '  +.803  +22.106 
6/For the 24-month monetary  base  regression, the significant  R2  may 
indicate some  relationship, even  though  the RZ  is  not  reliable  due to 
the existence of  serial correlation. For this regression, the sum of the 
coefficients  is  -2.673,  indicating a  negative relationship  between  the 
monetary  base  and the deficit.  It may  be that a deficit-induced rise in 
interest rates reduces the public's  demand for currency, which is a large 
portion of  the base. If this occurs, and if  the Federal Reserve does not 
respond  to the deficit  by  increasing  the  base,  a  negative  relationship 
between the base and the deficit would be expected. 
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for the 1970-74 period indicates that both M1 and 
M2 were related to and affected by the deficit in a 
statistically significant way. However, the analy- 
sis does not support the proposition that the Fed- 
eral  Reserve  responded to  the  deficit  by  taking 
actions that affected money. Rather, it appears that 
the Federal Reserve allowed the deficit to affect 
interest  rates.  Instead  of  arising  from  Federal 
Reserve  responses,  the  relationship between  the 
deficit and money was due to responses on the part 
of  the public and commercial banks. 
These  conclusions  are  supported  by  several 
findings. One is that, while M2 was positively re- 
lated  to  the deficit,  MI  was  negatively  related. 
That is, a deficit was associated with an increase 
in M2 and a decline in M  1. It appears therefore that 
a deficit led to a rise in interest rates, causing the 
public to shift out of MI balances into other assets. 
As  the offering  rates on  time deposits increased 
along with the increase in interest rates, part of the 
balances moving out of  M1  were transferred into 
the time deposit component of M2, offsetting part 
of the effect on M2 of the drop in MI.  The decline 
in  M1 and the rise in time deposits increased the 
excess  reserves of  banks  which,  along  with  the 
increases in  interest rates,  led  banks  to  acquire 
assets. Some of the prior decline in M1 was there- 
by  offset and  the rise in  time deposits was aug- 
mented. On balance, these responses by the public 
and commercial banks to a deficit-induced rise in 
interest rates resulted in  a decline in  M1  and  an 
increase in M2. 
The  conclusion that  the  Federal  Reserve re- 
sponded to the deficit by  allowing it to result in 
interest rate changes is further supported by  the 
results of regression analysis testing the relation- 
ship between the deficit and interest rates. These 
results provided some direct evidence that, during 
the  1970-74 period, interest rates were related to 
and affected by  the deficit. Finally, the empirical 
investigation  undertaken  in  this  article  did  not 
uncover any  statistically significant relationships 
during the 1970-74 period between the deficit and 
Federal Reserve operations,  as measured  by  the 
monetary base, member bank  reserves, and U.S. 
Government securities held by  the System.  This 
is consistent with the conclusion that the relation- 
ships  between  the  deficit  and  money  were  due 
to responses by  the public and commercial banks 
rather than to Federal Reserve responses. 
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By Blaine W.  Bickel 
M 
istory shows that prices of many agricultural 
products  exhibit  definite  seasonal  patterns 
which  reflect the  various marketing  practices  of 
farmers as well as the natural biological processes 
that  govern production. For example, the move- 
ment of  grain to market  usually  increases rather 
significantly during  the  harvest  period,  pushing 
prices down.  Likewise, the bulk of  the beef  calf 
crop is produced in the spring, so that many calves 
reach market size at about the same time each year. 
This uneven flow in the supply of  most farm com- 
modities, coupled with  changes in demand,  pro- 
duce  seasonal  price  movements  that  should  be 
considered when formulating a market strategy. 
Agriculture has been, at least until recent years, 
an industry bound  by  tradition.  Little effort was 
devoted  to  developing  a  marketing strategy,  as 
many farmers sold their crops right out of the field. 
A great deal of  on-farm storage capacity has been 
added in  recent years, however, as farmers have 
attempted to increase their returns by  waiting for 
a post-harvest rebound in  prices. The success of 
this  delayed-marketing strategy depends on both 
the magnitude of the price recovery and the degree 
of  confidence that' can be placed in the regularity 
of  the  seasonal  pattern.  If  a  price increase that 
exceeds storage and other holding costs is highly 
probable each year, the decision to postpone mar- 
keting  would  obviously  be  wise.  To  provide a 
framework for  the decision-making process,  the 
seasonal  price  patterns  of  several  commodities 
important to Tenth Federal Reserve District1 agri- 
culture are examined in this article. 
The changes in  any  price series over a long 
period of time can be attributed to secular, cyclical, 
seasonal,  and irregular factors. Secular changes 
occur gradually over a long period of time. Cyclical 
fluctuations take place at somewhat shorter inter- 
vals and may be associated with alternating periods 
of  expansion  and  contraction in  the  industry or 
with fundamental changes in market demand. Sea- 
sonal  patterns tend  to recur year after  year, and 
are of  prime importance to most agricultural pro- 
ducers.  Irregular  price  movements  cannot  be 
predicted, and due to their random nature are quite 
often offset by  another random movement within 
a relatively short period. 
To analyze the seasonal pattern in a price series, 
it  is first  necessary  to  eliminate the secular and 
cyclical movements from the data.  This analysis 
employs a statistical technique known as the ratio- 
to-moving average method to isolate and measure 
the  seasonal  rno~ement.~  Briefly,  the  first  step 
is to compute a 12-month moving average from the 
original  data  to obtain  the  cyclical  component. 
The original series is then divided by the 12-month 
moving average, which removes the long-term in-  -' 
l/Colorado,  Kansas,  Nebraska,  Wyoming, 43  western  Missouri 
counties. northern New Mexico, and most of Oklahoma. 
21Taro  Yamane,  Statistics,  An  Introductory  Analysis  (New  York: 
Harper and Row, 1964),  p. 357. 
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fluences and leaves a series that contains only sea- 
sonal  and  irregular  components.  This  series  is 
further  modified  by  computing  a  5-year moving 
average which minimizes the effects of the irregular 
factors.  The  result  is, an  index  that  provides  a 
quantitative  measure  of  the  amount  of  seasonal 
price fluctuation that recurs on a regular bask3 
Data for the analysis consist of monthly prices 
received  by  farmers for  selected  commodities 
over  the  20-year  period,  1955-74.  The seasonal 
patterns  of  these  commodities  are depicted  in 
Charts  1-6. In each of the charts, the heavy black 
line shows the means of  the seasonal indexes for 
each month of the year and represents the typical 
seasonal  price  pattern  for  the  commodity  being 
studied.  The vertical  distance  between  this  line 
and the index base of 100 represents the percentage 
that monthly prices typically vary from the aver- 
age annual price, regardless of  the absolute price 
level.  The shaded area on either side of this line 
includes  approximately  two-thirds  of  all  the 
monthly  observations,  and  is  referred  to  as the. 
variability  range.4 When  the  variability range  is 
narrow,  most of  the observations lie close to the 
average, indicating a seasonal pattern that occurs 
on a regular basis. As the variability range widens, 
a less regular seasonal pattern is indicated. 
These graphic results should not be interpreted 
too  literally.  Since  20  years  of  data  have  been 
averaged to produce these results, the chances are 
relatively  minor  that  any  particular  year  closely 
follows the observed seasonal pattern.  Yet, these 
seasonal price movements can be used as a general 
guide in making marketing decisions, thereby im- 
proving  the  chances  of  realizing  better-than- 
average results over the longer run. 
Wheat 
Wheat is the most important cash crop in the 
Tenth District. In recent years, Kansas production 
31For  a  detailed  description  of  the  steps  used  in  this  analysis.  see 
"The  X-l l  Variant  of  the  Census  Method  11  Seasonal  Adjustment 
Program," U.S.  Department  of  Commerce,  Bureau  of  the  Census, 
Technical  Paper,  No.  15  (Washington:  U.S. Government  Printing 
Office, 1965). 
4/The  vertical  distance on either side of the seasonal  index  is  ?  1 
standard deviation from the mean for each month. 
has  accounted  for  about  half  of  the  District's 
cash receipts from wheat, while much of the re- 
mainder  has  been  contributed  by  Colorado  and 
Oklahoma. The analysis deals with Kansas wheat 
prices  only,  although  price  patterns in  the other 
states appear to be similar. One minor difference 
was  observed.  Because  of  the  earlier  harvest, 
Oklahoma  prices  typically  reached  their  lowest 
level in June, as opposed to July in Kansas. 
Chart 1 shows that the price of wheat in Kansas 
generally  follows  a  predictable  pattern.  From  a 
harvest low in July, prices increase steadily through 
December, then decline until  the next harvest.  A 
grower who  sells  his  wheat  in  December  can 
expect to receive about 4 per cent more than the 
annual average price, and about 11 per cent more 
than  the  July  price.  However,  December  prices 
exhibit  considerable  variation,  particularly  when 
compared to prices in November. Therefore, even 
though prices traditionally peak near the end of the 
year, one could  more confidently  predict above- 
average prices for November than for December. 
The seasonal movement of Kansas wheat prices 
is somewhat irregular in July, August, and Sep- 
tember as evidenced by the relatively large amount 
of  price  variability  during  this  period.  This  re- 
flects  uncertainty about requirements and  usage 
during the marketing year. Wheat is a good live- 
stock feed, so there may be considerable substitu- 
tion  of  wheat for corn or grain  sorghum prior to 
the fall harvest of the latter two crops. Any change 
in expected production of these feed grains would 
therefore be reflected in wheat prices. In addition, 
wheat production in other parts of  the world di- 
rectly affects the export situation in this country, 
which adds to the sensitivity of Kansas wheat prices 
in the months immediately following harvest. 
The  variability  range  begins  to  narrow  in 
October and continues this trend through Novem- 
ber as supply and demand conditions for the mar- 
keting  year  become  better  defined.  In  addition, 
feed  grain  production  is a  known  quantity  by 
November,  and  the  irregularity  of  wheat  prices 
reaches  its  lowest  point.  As  the  average  price 
moves to its December high, the variability range 
widens dramatically,  and remains much the same 
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through January. The decision on whether to sell 
stored wheat in December, or hold it until after 
the first of  the year because of  income tax con- 
siderations, is probably a major influence on the 
market during these 2 months. Weather extremes 
would  also contribute to price variability at  this 
time of year. The band continues to narrow through 
February and  March as the relationship between 
supply and demand becomes well established, and 
weather is not usually a critical factor. But with 
the coming of spring, weather is of prime impor- 
tance.  Prices  generally  overreact  as  each  new 
production  forecast  is  made-whether  good  or 
bad-adding  to  the  variability  of  wheat  prices 
during this period. 
If  a producer elects to sell his wheat at some 
time other than harvest, the analysis shows that it 
would not normally pay to hold beyond December 
unless  some  highly  unusual  circumstances  pre- 
vailed.  Although wheat prices  usually rise after 
harvest,  this  increase  must  be  weighed  against 
storage costs. Assuming that storage costs are 1.5 
cents per bushel per month, hd  handling charges 
are 3 cents per bushel for receiving the grain and 
4  cents  per  bushel  for  shipping,  the  breakeven 
price for holding wheat for the first month of  the 
marketing year is 8.5 cents above the July price. 
Another 1.5 cents would be added for each addi- 
tional month the grain is stored. (On-farm storage 
costs  would  differ from  this example,  but  some 
costs would still be encountered.) 
For a practical application of  this relationship, 
Chart  1  shows  the  monthly  prices  received for 
wheat by  Kansas farmers in  1969 and  1972. To 
facilitate  comparison,  these  prices  have  been 
converted to an index by setting the annual average 
equal to 100. The year 1969 exhibited a very typical 
price pattern, yet storage costs would have offset 
the increase in wheat prices that occurred between 
harvest and the end of  the year. Delayed market- 
ing  in  1969  would  have  resulted in  a lower net 
return  than  marketing at  harvest,  for all  months 
except November. 
Chart  1  also illustrates the hazard of  relying 
too heavily on averages. Price movements in 1972 
were very  unorthodox due to the unexpected and 
unusually large purchase of  wheat by  Russia. Be- 
fore the extent of this transaction became known, 
wheat prices followed a normal seasonal pattern, 
but  the  picture changed dramatically during  the 
second half  of  the year as prices exploded in re- 
sponse to the large export commitment. 
Soybeans 
Chart 2 shows the seasonal price pattern for 
soybeans based on Missouri prices. From a harvest 
low in October, soybean prices typically climb at 
a fairly steady pace to a May high. The total price 
increase over this period averages 13 per cent. The 
seasonal index also shows that prices remain above 
average through August, then drop sharply toward 
the October low. 
Soybean prices exhibit an  unusual amount of 
variability during the spring and summer months. 
Speculation  about  whether  the  supply  will  last 
until the new crop is harvested has frequently pro- 
duced  major  price  swings  during  this  period. 
Weather also becomes a major factor in  the sum- 
mer  months as changes  in  production estimates 
for the new crop can influence price behavior. 
The best strategy appears to be to delay soybean 
marketings  for  at  least  4  months  after  harvest. 
From  February through May, and  again in July, 
there  is  a  good  chance  of  receiving  an  above- 
average price. The chart shows that soybean prices 
have  usually  reached their highest  level in  May 
and June,  but not  with  any consistency. The ex- 
tremely wide  confidence band  shows that  prices 
may also fall below the yearly average in June. 
The wide variability of soybean prices is also 
illustrated in  Chart  2  by  superimposing two  se- 
lected years on the seasonal pattern. As with wheat, 
the monthly  prices are expressed as a percentage 
of  the annual average.  Very little deviation from 
the typical seasonal pattern occurred in 1969. Ap- 
plying the same storage and  handling costs used 
in  the  wheat  example  to  1969  soybean  prices 
(October 1968 crop),  the optimum selling month 
was May.  Net  returns in May  were 9.5 cents per 
bushel  more  than  would  have  been  realized by 
selling in October. 
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In  1973,  however,  month-to-month  price 
changes  ranged from a 35 per cent increase to a 
30 per cent decline in reaction to a variety of stim- 
uli. A shortfall in Peruvian fish meal production, 
strong worldwide demand for high-protein feeds, 
and the emergence of the Soviet Union as a major 
soybean  buyer  sent  prices  skyrocketing  early  in 
the year. Then farmers planted the largest acreage 
on record  and  prices  fell  sharply  in  July,  staged 
a  short-lived  rally,  then  fell  again  as it  became 
apparent that supplies would exceed usage through 
the  approaching  market  year.  Because  of  this 
unusual price behavior, any soybean producer who 
held  his crop beyond  harvest enjoyed  a  tremen- 
dous  increase  in  net  returns.  From  an  average 
price of  $3.15 per  bushel in  October  1972, soy- 
bean  prices  peaked  at $9.80  per  bushel  in  June 
1973, producing a potential  net gain of $6.46 per 
bushel for the 8 months storage. 
The  evidence suggests  that  net  returns  from 
soybeans  can  usually  be  increased  by  delaying 
marketings  for  at  least  4  months,  but  the  exact 
timing is quite dependent on current conditions. 
Corn 
The seasonal pattern  of  Nebraska corn prices 
is  illustrated  in  Chart  3.  Compared  with  wheat 
and soybeans, corn prices generally display a more 
regular seasonal pattern as evidenced by the nar- 
rower  range  or variability.  However,  there  is  a 
longer time lag between the harvest low  and  the 
point at which corn prices move above the annual 
average.  The lag is 6 months for corn, compared 
with 4 months for soybeans and only 2 months for 
wheat.  Therefore,  corn  prices  normally  exceed 
the  annual  average  only  5  months  of  the  year, 
from May through September. 
Nebraska corn  prices usually reach their low 
in  November and  exhibit a rather quick recovery 
in December. Prices are very stable from January 
through March, then an upward movement carries 
corn prices to an August level that is slightly more 
than 5 per cent above the annual average and almost 
11  per cent above the November low. Except for 
a bulge in August, the variability range maintains 
a relatively stable width. August is a critic4 month 
in the development of  corn. Extremely hot or dry 
weather in  late July or August,  as in  1974, can 
have  a devastating  effect  on corn  production.  If 
silk  development  is  retarded,  pollination  will  be 
hindered, and the ear will not fill properly. 
In  general,  it  appears  that  returns  could  be 
maximized over time by  holding corn until June, 
July,  or  possibly  August.  Again,  however,  the 
potential increase in price must be weighed against 
storage costs. 
Hogs 
Chart  4 shows the  seasonal  price  pattern  for 
slaughter  hogs at Omaha. The average  price for 
all barrows and gilts sold for slaughter was used 
for this analysis,  which undoubtedly resulted in a 
smoothing of  the month-to-month  price changes. 
Yet,  compared  with  the  crop  prices  examined, 
Chart 4 shows a much greater price range between 
the summer high and winter low. 
Most  hog  producers strive for two pig  crops 
each year. Hog prices are therefore unique in that 
they  move  through  two  corresponding  up-and- 
down  cycles  each  year.  A  major  upward  price 
movement  reaches  its  peak  in  the  late  summer, 
while a secondary movement peaks in late winter. 
The fall  pig crop is the smaller of  the two, and 
when  these  pigs  are  marketed  6  months  later, 
the price depressing effect is not as great as when 
the larger spring pig crop is marketed in the fall. 
The seasonal  price  line reaches lows that are 
4 per cent and 8 per cent below the annual average 
in  April  and  November,  respectively.  The Feb- 
ruary peak is only slightly above the annual aver- 
age, while July prices can be expected to top the 
yearly average by 10 per cent. The summer prices 
would probably be even higher except for the sub- 
stantial number of  sows sold for slaughter at that 
time of year. 
If hog producers aim for July or August sales 
and  avoid  the  month  of  November,  they  could 
expect above-average returns in most years. How- 
ever,  this  would  require  shifting  farrowings  to 
January  and  July,  when  weather  extremes  be- 
come  a  critical  factor  unless  the  hog  producer 
is equipped to furnish adequate shelter. 
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Feeder Cattle 
The analysis of feeder cattle prices at Kansas 
City  is  depicted  in  Chart  5.  The range  through 
which feeder cattle  prices fluctuate  each  year  is 
rather limited relative to the price movements for 
commodities  previously discussed.  From the De- 
cember low to the April high, the usual  price in- 
crease is only 9 per cent. Considering the natural 
pattern of birth in the spring and marketing in the 
fall, it is somewhat surprising that prices vary so 
little.  A radical  departure  from  the  usual  pattern 
occurred in 1974, when a year-long price decline 
left December feeder cattle prices at approximately 
one-half the January level. 
The apparent discrepancy in variation between 
prices and  marketings of  feeder  cattle can  be  at 
least  partly  explained  by  the  change  in  demand 
during  the  course of  the  year.  The demand  for 
feeder cattle to be placed in feedlots is very high 
in the fall of  the year, so prices are only slightly 
below the annual average in spite of the large num- 
ber of animals placed on the market at that time. 
Conversely, when the supply of feeder cattle falls 
off in the spring, prices move only 5 per cent above 
the annual average because a fairly sharp decline 
in demand also occurs at that time of year. 
There  is  probably  little  the  average  rancher 
can  do to alter the marketing schedule of  feeder 
cattle. Spring calving is not a chance occurrence. 
It is planned to avoid weather extremes-particu- 
larly cold-which would cause undue stress on, or 
even  loss  of,  new-born  calves.  In  addition,  the 
annual production cycle is closely  associated with 
the  grazing  season. Hence,  feeder  cattle  prices 
are related to the grazing season. Prices are high 
in the spring when cattle are needed to utilize the 
abundant supply of  grass.  As fall approaches and 
herds must be removed from the range as the graz- 
ing season ends, prices tend to slump below the 
yearly average. 
The relatively narrow band around the seasonal 
index indicates that the  price pattern  is a regular 
one,  having a  high  probability of  recurring each 
year. The only exception  seems to be  the  month 
of August, generally the hottest and often the driest 
month. The effect of weather on range conditions, 
and ranchers'  responses to these conditions, prob- 
ably explain most of the increased price variability 
in August. 
Slaughter Steers 
The average  monthly  prices  of  all  grades  of 
steers sold  for slaughter in Omaha  was also ana- 
lyzed. As shown in Chart 6, slaughter steerprices- 
like those for feeder cattle-tend  to move through 
a rather narrow range in most years, although 1974 
was an exception. Average prices change less than 
8 per cent from the August high to the December 
low. Furthermore, the seasonal pattern is not very 
regular  as judged  by  the  width  of  the variability 
range. 
The growth of  the cattle feeding industry has 
undoubtedly played a major role in smoothing the 
line  representing  the  seasonal  index  in  Chart  6. 
Feedlots  generally  strive  for  consistency-not 
only in the quality of  the product but also in the 
quantity. Some delay in marketing can occur, but 
once an animal reaches a certain stage of "finish," 
additional  feeding  becomes  progressively  more 
expensive and wasteful. Anything more than short- 
term  changes  in  normal  marketing  patterns  are 
therefore effectively eliminated. 
The seasonal  pattern  of  slaughter steer prices 
is especially important to the producer who markets 
on  an  irregular  basis  or  only  a  few  times  each 
year. In most years, this individual should attempt 
to concentrate marketings in late summer and avoid 
the winter months when prices are usually at their 
low  point.  But  this schedule  may  present  a con- 
flict for the feeder who purchases animals to place 
on  feed.  Assuming  the  typical  feeding  period  is 
140 days to 150 days, slaughter cattle that would 
be ready for market in late summer must be placed 
in the feedlot in  the spring.  Unfortunately,  this is 
when feeder cattle prices are at their highest. 
With any analysis  of  historical  data, there is 
no guarantee  that  the observed  relationships  and 
patterns of the past will remain valid in future years. 
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Seasonal highs and lows may shift over time as a 
result  of  the development of  new  crop varieties 
that mature at different  times of  the year or as a 
result  of  new  marketing  practices.  Although  the 
evidence is still inconclusive, the data suggest that 
the low point for both wheat and soybean  prices 
may  now  be occurring slightly earlier than at the 
beginning  of  the  period  included  in  the  study. 
Earlier maturing varieties may be partly responsible 
for such a shift, and other technological improve- 
ments have probably contributed  to this develop- 
.  ment as well. The ability to harvest and transport 
the crop more rapidly could result in an earlier and 
more concentrated marketing of the commodity. 
The very fact that producers are becoming more 
sophisticated and market oriented in their planning 
can  also produce changes  in  seasonal  price  pat- 
terns. If  production cycles are altered to take ad- 
vantage of seasonal price movements, the highs and 
lows may be shifted to different months. Further- 
more,  if  marketing  programs  are  also  changed, 
marketings may be less concentrated and the sea- 
sonal price pattern would be smoothed as a result. 
While  some  shifting  and  smoothing  can  be 
expected over a long period of  time, the seasonal 
indexes presented in  this study  were found to be 
statistically valid. It was determined that the means 
of the seasonal indexes for individual months were 
significantly different from each other, indicating 
that  the  observed  month-to-month changes  were 
not just random movements. 
As  previously  mentioned, price changes over 
time can be classified as secular, cyclical, seasonal, 
and irregular.  The amount of  price  variation  at- 
tributable  to the seasonal  component for each of 
the  six  commodities  analyzed  in  this  study  is 
shown  in Table  1.  Using  wheat  as an example, 
slight!y  more than one-fourth of the variation from 
one month to the next was due to the seasonal in- 
fluence.  (The remainder was distributed  between 
cyclical  and irregular  influences.)  Expanding the 
Table 1 
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Time  Span in Months 
Commodity  123456  --- 
Per  cent -  - 
Wheat  26.1  30.8  34.5  33.4  30.5  25.8 
Corn  42.0  50.3  52.0  49.8  45.6  40.8 
Soybeans  28.5  36.7  37.6  37.2  35.6  32.4 
SlaughterHogs  53.2  54.3  50.9  41.6  .32.9  28.6 
Feeder Cattle  27.6  34.9  36.1  33.1  28.9  24.5 
Slaughtercattle  34.3  36.8  37.5  34.9  32.0  29.4+, 
time span to 3 months, more than one-third of the 
variation in wheat prices was due to seasonal fac- 
tors.  In fact, the seasonal component achieves its 
greatest importance during the 3-month time span 
in  all cases except hogs.  Since hog  prices  move 
through two cycles each year, it is not surprising 
to find the seasonal influence dominating the 1- and 
2-month periods. 
Beyond the sixth month, the seasonal influence 
declines  rapidly for most commodities as the cy- 
clical component begins to dominate the series. 
Seasonal  indexes can  be  useful  management 
tools for anticipating  the  short-run  movement of 
commodity prices. But the average will seldom be 
followed exactly in any given year, so the producer 
needs  to add  his  own  judgment  to the current 
situation  and  outlook.  An  understanding  of  sea- 
sonal  price  patterns  can  sometimes  be  used  to 
schedule production to avoid low price months or 
to concentrate marketings in the period that offers 
above-average  prices.  This  may  not  be  the  best 
strategy in any given year, but over time the pro- 
ducer  should  enjoy  above-average results.  In an 
industry  that  is  frequently  confronted  with  nar- 
row, if not negative, profit margins, good market- 
ing  strategies  are essential  for the long-run  sur- 
vival of the firm. 
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